The UK is in a mexican standoff with the EU: who will win?

Looking at the entrenched positions and the aggressive moves and countermoves deployed by the UK and EU in their divorce negotiations, it’s tempting to reach for world war one metaphors. Certainly to hear them speak it would appear to be an existential battle in which no quarter can be given. For the EU, Brexit must not only be thought of as worse than membership but must demonstrably be so, otherwise, the theory goes, others may choose to follow and the whole project may collapse. For the UK, unless full sovereignty is returned, it will be Brexit in name only (Brino), a half in, half out purgatory worse than either alternative. If Brexit is to have meaning at all, it must mean Brexit! The Battle of the Somme then? Or, if you’re of Remainer bent, an earlier conflict, the Charge of the Light Brigade perhaps? Whatever, in this account the bullets are real and damage is being done. There is an alternative way of looking at this though, rather than a fight to the death perhaps we can liken the negotiations to a protracted military parade? One in which nations proudly march their arsenal down a leafy boulevard in a show to the world of what they are capable. It is martial, for sure, but in of itself it is not a signifier of imminent war, much less actual battle. A spectacle then. A posture. And this week we have witnessed not shelling, but fireworks. How so? The UK government’s move to unilaterally amend the Withdrawal Agreement in contravention of International Law - something the government openly admits is true - is surely an extraordinarily aggressive move? In diplomatic terms can you be more pugnacious without crossing the line into outright hostility? And now the EU’s response, which is to lay down an ultimatum from which there can be no stepping back, but before which they know the Boris Johnson government can surely not bow - not without holing themselves below the waterline - has created a mexican standoff. And we know how they end! Or do we? The last eight months has been one long restatement of long established positions. The EU says it will not budge on its redlines, the UK likewise. Each believes (or in the UK’s case, hopes) the other is bluffing, but until now there has been no way of knowing. How then should the impasse be broken? Consider also that in one crucial regard, the positions are unequal. Each is asking for access to the other’s market, but thanks to the Withdrawal agreement, the consequences of no deal is that much more painful for the UK, especially in respect of its constitutional settlement with Northern Ireland and in particular vis-a-vis the Good Friday Agreement. How should the EU utilise this strength they have? By waiting of course. By letting the reality of the UK’s relative weakness work its inevitable pressure. And how should the UK escape this bind? How indeed! The UK’s problem is this. It would like the EU to accept it is serious about leaving without a deal, but the EU refuses to believe this because it knows how much pain it will cause the UK. And yet if the EU could only be convinced the UK is serious, then whatever compromises the EU is prepared to make will be unlocked and the real negotiation can begin. But the clock is ticking, and if the EU is only going to be convinced at the last minute before midnight, then the scope for real negotiations is limited. There is a further issue for the UK, what if the EU is secretly happy with either outcome? For example, if the EU sticks to its hardline and the UK folds then it has got a good deal. Furthermore, the inherent alignment with EU laws and practices within such an agreement, and the failure of the UK’s government to be strong in the face of EU pressure, paves the way both for the UK to return to the EU if and when a pro-EU party wins the UK elections, and makes it more likely that another party actually does win the next election. On the other hand, if the UK doesn’t fold, then the structural cracks in the UK internal market the Withdrawal agreement has created, get baked in. They become the weak spot into which multiple opponents of the current government can drive repeated wedges. A weeping sore which can’t and won’t be healed before the next general election. What will that do to arch Brexiteer Boris Johnson’s chances of being reelected? Of course the EU will prefer one of these outcomes over another, but perhaps in terms of long term strategic advantage, both are better than granting the UK a more generous FTA? Either way, this reveals a third and crucial point. The EU already knows what it wants, it knows the concessions it is prepared to make. It knows its minimum acceptable outcome. And there is no amount of UK negotiating which will do anything to change that. Or so it seemed. And so we come to this week’s shenanigans. Lord Frost, the UK’s chief negotiator, said recently that ever since he joined the process he’d been fighting an uphill battle to convince the EU they are serious about leaving with no deal rather than compromise on issues of sovereignty. Rather than focus on the structural weakness the WA bakes into the UK negotiating position of course, he blamed it on the former administration’s repeated tough talking and weak walking. It doesn’t matter, because his analysis, as we have seen, is essentially accurate. Lord Frost went on to suggest that until he could convince the EU that they meant what they said there would be no progress. But how could he convince them? Boris could come out and talk tough again, but so what? They could step up no deal preparations, but as even the government has said, this money would generally have needed to be spent anyway, so what does it really prove? They needed something totemic, something which would detonate with a flash and an almighty bang, something which would prove, once and for all, that they were ready to leave without a deal on December 31st. And that is what this week's proposed legislation is all about. By writing it into law, the government does the equivalent of publicly tying its shoelaces to the juggernaut’s accelerator pedal and dares the other side to risk the collision. It answers the EU’s challenge, how far are you prepared to go? By saying this far and it's further than you thought, isn’t it? And at the same time it defuses WA ticking time bomb, whilst making Boris look stronger not weaker. In the mexican standoff analogy above, it is the equivalent of slowly cocking the revolver, the UK’s eyes narrowing, the toothpick moving from one side of the mouth to the other. Now the EU knows. Now the EU must decide. It is a ballsy, risky move. After all these are loaded guns we’re pointing at each other, and the danger is that events take over, bad actors take advantage, and without quite knowing how, triggers end up pulled. But it is also, paradoxically, the move which perhaps offers the best chance of an amicable deal being reached. In understanding the limits each side will go to, and understanding that they are not pretty, both parties are now incentivised to get real. The EU has its minimal acceptable position, it already knows what it is and now it can put it forward (perhaps after a short interval for reasons of decorum) because it now knows that waiting won’t improve its position. If, after that, it’s not good enough for the UK, then nothing they were prepared to offer would have been anyway. So, how does a mexican standoff usually end? Well I would contend that it is with all parties putting their guns away and finding a compromise.